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MAJORITY AND MINORITY WHIPS OF THE SENATE

HISTORY AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE PARTY WHIP SYSTEM IN THE U.S. SENATE

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History and Development of the Party Whip System in the U.S. Senate*

The activities of congressional party leaders have long intrigued scholars and other observers of the legislative process.[1] Typically, journalists and scholars focus their attention on the chief House and Senate leaders: the Speaker and the floor leaders. Party whips have also been the subject of analyses, particularly in the House.[2] The whip system in the Senate, however, has been a neglected area of study. The purposes of this document are to explain the historical development of the whip system in the Senate, including its origins in the British House of Commons; to discuss the functions of party whips in the Senate; and to describe the relationship between the whip and the party leader. Finally, some observations will be made about the selection of Senate whips.

HISTORY

British

"The Office of whip is a purely British institution; it is found in Ceylon and Ireland," Michael Ameller has written, "and as far as one can see in all Commonwealth countries which have based their Parliament on that of the United Kingdom." [3]

The term "whip" has two distinct parliamentary meanings in England. The "whip" refers not only to party officials, like those in the U.S. Senate, but to a written document as well. A definition of what the document is and how it is employed by British party whips should clarify this item's purpose.

The Government and Opposition Whips send to their respective party members a weekly document called a whip. This notice (whip) informs Members of legislative activities for the next week. Members are informed about the priority or urgency of matters by a system of underlining. Each legislative matter in the whip notice is underlined according to its importance. A one-line whip indicates

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* The comments and suggestions of Louis Fisher, Walter Kravitz, Fred Pauls and Roger Davidson are gratefully acknowledged. Portions of this study appeared in 33 "Journal of Politics" 955-979 (November 1971).

[1] See, for example, George Brown, "The Leadership of Congress" (1922); Paul Hasbrouck, "Party Government in the House of Representatives" (1927); Ralph Huitt, "Democratic Party Leadership in the Senate," 55 "American Political Science Review" 333-344 (June 1961); Randall B. Ripley, "Power in the Senate" (1969); Randall B. Ripley, "Majority Party Leadership in Congress" (1969); Margaret R. Munk, "Origin and Development of the Party Floor Leadership in the United States Senate," (unpublished Ph. D. dissertation, Harvard University, (1970); Robert L. Peabody, "Leadership in Congress, Stability. Succession, and Change" (1976); and "Policymaking Role of Leadership in the Senate," a compilation of papers prepared for the Commission on the Operation of the Senate, 94th Cong., 2d sess. (1976).

[2] Randall B. Ripley, "The Party Whip Organizations in the U.S. House of Representatives." 58 "American Political Science Review" 561-576 (September 1964) and Lawrence C. Dodd and Terry Sullivan, "Majority Party Leadership and Partisan Vote Gathering: The House Democratic Whip System," in Frank H. Mackaman, ed., Understanding Congressional Leadership (1981), 227-260.

[3] Michael Ameller, "Parliaments" (1962), 100-101.

that no vote is likely; a two-line notice means that the business is fairly important and a vote is possible; and a three-line whip means that every Member is expected on the floor since an important debate and vote is scheduled. Norman Wilding and Philip Laundy reported that whips—underscored by as many as six lines—were used in the House of Commons as early as 1621.[4]

Whips were first used in 1621, one scholar wrote, when notices were sent to the King's friends in the House of Commons.[5] A royal whip issued on September 21, 1675 said:[6]

> Sir J. Williamson to a Member of Parliament. The King being firm resolved that Parliament shall meet October 13, that you may not be surprised with any contrary reports, nor be detained by the business of the sessions, which is unhappily is near that time, has commanded me to give you this notice, and to desire you will not fail to be here at or before the time appointed, and I desire you will let me know as soon as you come to town, that I may acquaint the King how his commands to me have been executed.

During the 17th and much of the 18th centuries, whip notices were referred to either as "circular letters," "treasury notes," or "treasury letters." The reason: the Secretary to the Treasury in the 1750's began to assume functions comparable to modern-day party whips. As explained by Dora Clark, Treasury Secretaries were frequently named tellers to record votes, and "in that position a secretary could readily count the friends and foes of Government." In addition, he "drew up the division lists, which indicated the strength of Government and formed a record of individual votes. As the Secretary to the Treasury had at his disposal information in regard to all the Members who had received favors from the Government (such as pensions, places, contracts, or assistance in elections, either for themselves or their friends), he was advantageously situated to whip in those members when an important vote was to be taken." [7] The Secretary to the Treasury distributed such information in a "circular letter" to his friends.

Leaders of ad hoc groups in the House of Commons also sent circular letters to their friends, particularly at the start of each legislative session. For example, on October 17, 1761, Lord Sandwich received the following notice: [8]

> The Duke of Newcastle sends his compliments to my Lord Sandwich, and begs the favor of his Lordship to send to all his friends; and particularly to those here mentioned, to attend, without fail, the first day (November 3) of the Session; and to be at the general meeting at the Cockpit, the night before, Monday, November 2.

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[4] Norman Wilding and Philip Laundy, "An Encyclopedia of Parliament" (1958), 658.

[5] Edward Poritt, "The Unreformed House of Commons. I" (1903), 509.

[6] Information provided by Right Honorable Francis Pym, Chief Whip, Conservative Party, British House of Commons, Mar. 11, 1971.

[7] Dora Mae Clark, "The Office of Secretary of the Treasury," 42 "The American Historical Review," 22-45 (October 1936).

[8] L.B. Namier, "The Circular Letters: An 18th Century Whip to Members of Parliament," 44 "English Historical Review" 588, 604 (October 1929).

By 1763, according to L. B. Namier, "the procedure of the 'circular letter' was firmly established, and it even seems that the withholding of that 'whip' was considered a slight." [9]

Whips underlined in red ink for divisions of supreme importance were introduced during the session of 1893, by Mr. Edward Majoribanks (the chief Ministerial whip, later Lord Tweedmouth), when the Home Rule bill was under protracted discussion. [10]

Turning to the whip as party official, Edmund Burke is often considered the first to use the term to denote a party leader. As described by Robert Luce: [11]

> In May 1769 there was a great debate in the House of Commons on the petition against the return of Colonel Luttrell for Westminster in the place of Alderman Wilkes, who had been expelled from the House by its order. The King's Ministers made great efforts to bring their followers together from all quarters for this debate. Burke, who took part in the debate, referrred to these efforts, and described how Ministers had sent for their friends to the north and to Paris, whipping them in, than which, he said, there could not be a better phrase.

Burke was referring to the "whipper-in," a huntsman assigned the task of keeping the hounds from straying during a fox hunt, whipping them back into line if necessary. According to Lord Bossom, a former Member of Parliament: "Since that time the Members responsible for this marshalling of the forces and for giving out information have been called whips, and occupy an important position in both the government and opposition parties." [12]

To be a successful leader in this office requires certain abilities. According to Wilding and Laundy, Disraeli summed this up when he said the whip's office required "consummate knowledge of human nature, the most amiable flexibility, and complete self-control." [13]

There is a common expression in England about this leader's chief function: The whip's job is "to make a House, to keep a House, and cheer the Minister." [14] The meaning of the last phrase is self-evident, while the first two refer to the whip's job (1) to insure that sufficient Members of his party are present to constitute a quorum and (2) to guarantee that his party can outvote the opposition in any division by keeping his Members on the floor. It is especially important for Government whips to insure that their party receive a majority vote—as large as possible—on every issue, because a "snap-vote" that is lost by the government damages their prestige within and without the chamber. According to Ivor Jennings, a division lost by the majority party "creates the impression that Government supporters are not keen in their support or are failing in their parliamentary duties, and it encourages the opposi-

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[9] Ibid., 611.

[10] Information provided by Right Honorable Francis Pym, Chief Whip, Conservative Party, British House of Commons, Mar. 11, 1971.

[11] Robert Luce, "Legislative Procedure" (1922), 501.

[12] Lord Bossom of Maidstone, "Our House" (1965), 102.

[13] Wilding and Laundy, "An Encyclopedia of Parliament," 659.

[14] W. Ivor Jennings, "Parliament," 2d ed. (1957), 84. See Kenneth Bradshaw and David Pring, "Parliament and Congress" (1972), 27, 48.

tion, both in the House and outside." [15] Thus, the job of the Government or chief whip is to prevent such losses while the opposition whip's task is to inflict as many defeats or narrow majorities as possible upon the majority party.

To avoid such parlimentary defeats, the chief whip and his assistants see that all party members are kept informed of current legislative business and that they are present for all important debates and votes. Each party, of course, always has a whip or whips on the floor to follow debate and to protect their party's interests. If a Member wishes to be absent, the respective party whips arrange "pairs" for these legislators.

The numerous contacts that the chief whip, his opposition counterpart, and their assistants have with their party members enable them to act as channels of communication between the party leaders and the rank-and-file membership. For example, the chief whip collects and evaluates the various policy views expressed by the party members and passes this information on to the Prime Minister. If a Member or group of Members is discontented, the chief whip also passes this information on to the party leader. It was reported, for example, that Disraeli "used to be given a list of his supporters who were getting restive by his whips, and he would make a point of having a word with them in the division lobby, using his famous charm to soothe their wounded feelings." [16] All of this is part of a reciprocal process in which the whips attempt to influence the attitudes of the rank-and-file to insure party unity, and party members, in turn, attempt to influence the whips, and through them, their party leaders.

United States

From 1789 to 1913, Senate party whips did not exist, to the best of our knowledge, even though our national legislature followed many of the legislative practices of the English Parliament. It is likely that certain legislators performed tasks similar to those of contemporary whips, but the institutionalization of the office apparently did not occur until the 20th century.

A probable explanation for the lack of whips is that strong political parties evolved in the Senate only after decades of development. James Young, for example, concluded that in the period from 1800 to 1825 "parties on the Hill were largely unorganized groups. They were without an openly recorded membership, much less with differentiated leadership roles." [17] In 1874, Senator Justin Morrill (Republican, Vermont) noted this lack of party organization when he said:

> I do not propose to act as "the whip" of the Senate. I think the Senators are quite competent to express their own judgment without any whip. We have never had what is called a whip in the American Senate.[18]

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[15] Ibid., 86.
[16] Robert James, "An Introduction to the House of Commons" (1961), 60.
[17] James S. Young, "The Washington Community, 1800–1828" (1966), 147.
[18] Congressional Record 2488 (Mar. 26, 1874).

As late as 1885 Senate parties were still without coherence, exercising only limited influence.[19]

In 1913 the first Democratic party whip—J. Hamilton Lewis of Illinois—was appointed. Senator Lewis wrote: "So far as I have been able to learn, I was the first Democratic whip appointed in the history of the U.S. Senate. It was during the first Wilson Administration." [20] The New York Times gave the following account of Senator Lewis's appointment:

> As a further precaution against a snap division in the Senate by which the Democrats might find themselves in the minority, the caucus elected Senator J. Hamilton Lewis of Illinois today to serve as "whip," although designated as assistant to Majority Leader Kern in the capacity of floor leader. Mr. Lewis's chief duty will be to see that Democrats are present or paired at every rollcall.
>
> The appointment of an assistant to Senator Kern, though brought about in a way to avoid wounding the majority leader's pride, is in fact partly explained by general dissatisfaction with Mr. Kern's leadership.[21]

The biographer of Majority Leader John Worth Kern (Democrat, Indiana) contended, however, that poor attendance at some party caucuses angered Senator Kern and resulted in the appointment of a party whip:

> At times when the regular Democratic attendance had dwindled to a corporal's guard his impatience manifested itself in caucus, where on one occasion he supplemented his appeal with sarcastic protests, and a "party whip" was selected to assist him.[22]

Two factors, then, seem to have produced conditions leading to the creation of a party whip post: (1) Democratic dissatisfaction with their floor leader and (2) Senator Kern's need for an assistant to insure both attendance at party caucuses and on the Senate floor.

Having observed the Democratic innovation, the Republicans in 1915 appointed as their first party whip Senator James Wadsworth of New York, who served but 1 week until Senator Charles Curtis of Kansas was named as his successor.[23] As Senator Robert C. Byrd of West Virginia explained:

> [T]wo years after the Democrats had elected their first Whip, the Republican Conference Chairman, Jacob Gallinger of New Hampshire, recommended that the Republicans also establish the position of Whip. Both Parties had experienced difficulties in those years in keeping sufficient numbers of members available to maintain a quorum and

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[19] David J. Rothmann, "Power and Politics: The United States Senate, 1862-1901" (1966), chs. 2 and 3.

[20] 80 Congressional Record 7045 (May 12, 1936).

[21] New York Times, May 29, 1913, 1.

[22] Claude G. Bowers, "The Life of John Worth Kern" (1918), 351.

[23] Letter from Mark Trice, Secretary for the minority, to Lewis J. Williams, Legislative Reference Service, Oct. 2, 1950. Enclosed in this letter was a list of all Republican party whips and the dates of their service, compiled by Mr. Trice from the Republican Conference minutes.

> conduct Senate business. On December 6, 1915, Senator James Wadsworth, Jr., the father-in-law of former Senator Stuart Symington, was elected both Secretary [of the Conference] and Whip, but a week later it was decided to divide the responsibilities into two offices. Wadsworth remainded as Secretary and Senator Charles Curtis of Kansas, later a vice president of the United States, was elected whip.[24]

SOME CHANGES IN THE WHIP'S OFFICE

Like other party leadership positions, party whips are not provided for in the standing rules of the Senate, though beginning in 1955 the Legislative Branch Appropriations bill contained funds for two clerical assistants, one for the majority whip and one for the minority whip.[25]

Prior to 1944, the historical data reveal few changes in the office of the Senate whip. On February 18, 1944, Senate Republicans for the first time formalized their conference rules. These rules provided for the election of an assistant floor leader (whip) and other party officers.[26]

Since 1944 the role of the party whip has evolved or expanded in at least four ways.

First, a Senate-approved provision of the Legislative Reorganization Act of 1946 recommended that the majority and minority parties establish policy committees at the beginning of each new Congress. These party policy committees were "to plan the legislative program, coordinate and guide committee activity, focus party leadership and strengthen party responsibility and accountability."[27] This provision was deleted by the House but subsequently the majority and minority parties of the Senate did establish policy committees by statute. These policy units have varied in importance over the years, but for our purpose it is important to note that the whips of each party sit *ex officio* on them.

In 1946, the Republicans did the following:

> The conference decided to make the Steering Committee into a real policy-making body, through which legislative recommendations would begin clearing tomorrow. On this committee the conference put Senators Taft, C. Wayland Brooks, Albert Hawkes, Homer Ferguson, Guy Cordon, and Leverett Saltonstall. Ex-officio members, in light of their key posts, will be Senators White as majority leader, Millikin as conference chairman, and Wherry as whip.[28]

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[24] 126 Congressional Record S10655 (Aug. 4, 1980).

[25] Public Law 84-242, 69 Stat. 502 (1955).

[26] Senate Republican Conference Rules, Feb. 9, 1971, 2. It is interesting to note that on Jan. 6, 1960, Senate Republicans adopted in conference a resolution which provided that the seat next to the floor leader shall be occupied by the whip, and "should he cease to be Whip he shall be assigned a seat in accordance with his seniority rights." Personal interview, Mr. Mark Trice, Secretary to the Senate Republicans, July 24, 1972, Washington, D.C. This practice became formalized for Democrats at the start of the 85th Congress (1957). See Congressional Directory, 1913-1972.

[27] See report by George B. Galloway, "Operation of Legislative Reorganization Act of 1946." Reprinted in 115 Congressional Record 36006 (Nov. 26, 1969). Also Hugh A. Bone, "Party Committees and National Politics" (1958), ch. 6 and 126 Congressional Record S10612 (Aug. 1, 1980).

[28] New York Times, Dec. 8, 1946, 8.

The Democrats also made their whip an *ex officio* member of the Policy Committee. During the January 15, 1947 meeting of the Conference, Democratic Leader Alben Barkley of Kentucky, chairman of both the Conference and Policy Committee, "suggested that the Democratic Whip and the Secretary of the Conference be invited to meet with the Policy group. The suggestion was accepted and the Whip and the Secretary became *ex officio* members of the Committee." [29]

Policy Committees often assume a greater importance in the Senate under two circumstances: When a party does not control the Presidency or when it has majority control of the Senate. According to former Majority Leader Mike Mansfield (Democrat, Montana), beginning in 1967 the Democratic Policy Committee gradually became an important party instrumentality.[30] After Republican President Richard M. Nixon's ascendancy to the White House, the Democratic Policy Committee became especially active in developing public and party policies.[31] Senator Mansfield announced on May 20, 1969, for example, that the Policy Committee would formulate Democratic positions in areas where there existed a substantial degree of unity among the members of the party. Senator Robert C. Byrd, then Democratic whip, suggested reasons why the Policy Committee exercised a stronger role at that time than it did before: first, Senator Mike Mansfield preferred to use the Policy Committee more than did his predecessor as Majority Leader, Lyndon Johnson, and, second, with Republican Nixon in the White House, Senate Democrats assumed a greater responsibility for initiating and developing a legislative program. In 1977, even with a Democratic President, the Policy Committee, under the chairmanship of Majority Leader Byrd, augmented the Committee's staff to enhance its analytical and coordinative capabilities.

During the 1980s, when the Democrats were the minority party in the Senate and Republicans controlled the White House, the Policy Committee—and Senate Democrats in general—actively worked to promote party consensus and to develop alternatives to GOP-sponsored policies. Senate Democratic Leader Byrd, for example, appointed several party task forces (industrial policy and medicare, for instance) which were largely staffed by Policy Committee aides.[32]

In short, several circumstances affect the role and purposes of the Democratic Policy Committee. The most significant factors, according to Senator Byrd, are:

> (1) whether the Democratic Party has retained a Majority in the Senate or . . . whether the Committee has had to function as the Minority Policy Committee;
>
> (2) whether there has been a Democratic Administration or if the Policy Committee has needed to formulate the

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[29] 126 Congressional Record S10612 (Aug. 1, 1980). Also see 93 Congressional Record 386 (Jan. 17, 1942).

[30] Personal interview, Senator Mike Mansfield, April 1970, Washington, D.C.

[31] See, for example, 116 Congressional Record 10959–10962 (April 9, 1970).

[32] See Richard E. Cohen, "Minority Status seems to Have Enhanced Byrd's Position Among Fellow Democrats," 15 "National Journal," 958–960 (May 7, 1983).

policy for the Democratic Party to follow in the Senate; and

(3) the personal style of the Committee Chairman, the Party's Leader in the Senate.[33]

To be sure, similar factors affect the activities of the Republican Policy Committee. For example, when Democrat Jimmy Carter won the presidency, the GOP Policy Committee, under Chairman John Tower of Texas, reorganized its staff and mission to strengthen the Committee's ability to develop policy alternatives to those proposed by the Democratic administration and their Senate allies. Explained Senator Tower:

> After the (1976) election, I felt that with the Republicans out of power in the White House, I wanted to do more to arrive at Republican positions here in Congress. During the Republican Administration, of course, we were generally taking our initiatives from the White House.[34]

When Republicans took control of the Senate and White House following the November 1980 elections, the Policy Committee emphasized its role in providing research and personnel services for Republican Senators. The GOP group, for example, analyzes record votes in the Senate, prepares weekly a summary of House and Senate committee activity, issues daily an "A.M. Update" that spotlights major changes in the schedule of committee and floor activities, and circulates the resumes of job applicants to GOP senators.

In 1981 the rules of the Senate Republican Conference were changed to make all standing committee chairmen members of the Policy Committee. Moreover, every GOP Senator is invited to attend the Tuesday meetings of the Policy Committee and offer suggestions about the legislative business of the Senate—identifying measures they want to consider and those they may want to avoid.

It was also during the weekly GOP Policy Committee meetings that Assistant Floor Leader Ted Stevens of Alaska discussed past, current, and prospective House activities. Republican Whip Stevens informally assumed the job of maintaining liaison with the House and presenting a weekly "House Report" to his Senate party colleagues. The bicameral connection was carried out principally by aides of Senator Stevens and House Republican Whip Trent Lott, Miss. Republican Whip Stevens, to be sure, also maintained personal contact with a selected number of House colleagues on both sides of the aisle. Senator Stevens realized that the lawmaking plans of Senate Republicans can hinge on how "the other body" reacted to the Senate's legislative and political endeavors.

When Robert J. Dole, R-Ka., and Alan K. Simpson, R-Wyo., became Majority Leader and Assistant Majority Leader, respectively, at the start of the 99th Congress (1985–87), they continued the practice of meeting with their House GOP counterparts. Senator Simpson also assumed responsibility for meeting periodically with

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[33] 126 Congressional Record S10612 (Aug. 1, 1980).

[34] Michael J. Malbin, "The Senate Republican Leaders—Life Without a President," 7 National Journal 780 (May 21, 1977).

appropriate Senate committee staff aides. An early objective of these meetings was to promote swift agreement on a GOP-crafted deficit reduction package. Quick action on the deficit was a GOP imperative for two key reasons: to win passage before special interests mobilized in force against spending cuts in their favorite programs and to attract majority support for program cuts sure to become politically unappealing as the 1986 election draws nearer. "It's got to be done now (early 1985), or it won't get done," said Majority Whip Simpson.[35]

In short, an important element of the whip's influence is a close knowledge of the workings of the Senate, including such things as its agenda of business, relations among committees and members, and a feel for the opinions of Senators on particular policies. And the Policy Committee of each party, "through its regular meetings, through the investigations of its staff, and through its discussion of the Senate agenda, is an institutionalized communications center" for providing a whip with at least some of this information.[36] This is significant for, as one scholar noted, leadership can be defined as "centrality in a communications network."[37]

A second development in the whip's office occurred in January 1966: the Senate Democratic Conference appointed as assistant whips the four members of its Legislative Review Committee, i.e., legislators who assist the Leader and Whip "in their floor duties and in monitoring the flow of legislation for the Senate chamber."[38] This was not, however, the first time that the Democrats had had assistant whips. During the 76th Congress, Sherman Minton (Democrat, Indiana) served as deputy whip to J. Hamilton Lewis (Democrat, Illinois)[39] while in 1937 Joseph Robinson (Democrat, Arkansas), the majority leader, was authorized by the party conference to appoint an assistant whip.[40]

In 1966 Senator Russell Long of Louisiana, then Democratic whip, described the duties of the newly appointed assistant whips:

> Those Senators were filling positions created by Lyndon Johnson when he was majority leader in the Senate; namely the so-called Calendar Committee, to sit in the majority leader's chair and help get on with the program of the Senate.
>
> Those Senators have been fulfilling that position, doing their jobs and acting in our absence whenever we could not be available to fill the leader's chair, because sometimes we are in conference committees, trying to make the will of the Senate prevail over the House, and sometimes we are necessarily absent from the Chamber, seeing our constituents, or carrying out our duties elsewhere.[41]

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[35] New York Times, Jan. 9, 1985, A20.
[36] David Truman, "The Congressional Party" (1959), 131.
[37] Nelson Polsby, "Congress and the Presidency" (1964), 44.
[38] See 126 Congressional Record S10613 (Aug. 1, 1980) and New York Times, Jan. 12, 1966, 15. Recounted Senator Robert C. Byrd during an August 1, 1980, floor statement: "The Legislative Review Committee or Calendar Review Committee, was created in 1953" by Democratic Leader Lyndon Johnson.
[39] New York Times, Jan. 1, 1939, 2.
[40] New York Times, Jan. 5, 1937, 15.
[41] 112 Congressional Record 595 (Jan. 19, 1966).

Called "deputy whips" today, they are appointed by the Democratic Leader and Democratic Whip and included for the 98th Congress (1983–85) Senators Max Baucus (Montana), Alan J. Dixon (Illinois), Christopher J. Dodd (Connecticut), J. James Exon (Nebraska), Wendell H. Ford (Kentucky), John Glenn (Ohio), Walter D. Huddleston (Kentucky), Patrick J. Leahy (Vermont), David Pryor (Arkansas), Donald W. Riegle, Jr. (Michigan), and Paul S. Sarbanes (Maryland). In 1980, Senator Spark M. Matsunaga (Hawaii), previously a deputy whip, was named to a new position: Chief Deputy Whip. His task is to assist the Democratic Leaders in coordinating and managing the work of the deputy whips (for further discussion of deputy whips, see p. 14). The chief deputy whip may also function as the whip's proxy during his official absences from the Senate.

A third change in the whip's position occurred in the Republican party: a change in title. On October 7, 1969, "the Republican conference met and unanimously adopted a motion to change in the conference rules the title of 'whip' to that of 'assistant [Republican] leader.'" [42] Senator Mansfield changed Senator Edward Kennedy's (Democrat, Massachusetts) title as well, for a 1970 Congressional Directory identified him as the "assistant majority leader." [43] In 1971, however, with the election of Robert C. Byrd (West Virginia) to the post, the Democrats returned to the title of whip. This was done at the request of Senator Byrd, who preferred that title because of its parliamentary and congressional history.[44]

With the election in 1969 of Senator Hugh Scott (Pennsylvania) as Republican leader and Senator Robert Griffin (Michigan) as assistant leader, the role of the whip on the Republican side was greatly expanded. Senator Griffin brought to the position a keen interest in improving communications among Republican Senators. He saw to it that "Whip Notices" were prepared and distributed to Republicans on a regular basis. This was started with the beginning of the 1970 session, and provided Members with a concise description of the legislative program for the week ahead.[45] In the English way, underlining was used to indicate, as nearly as possible, when votes were expected on the floor of the Senate (below is a copy of a 1985 Republican whip notice).

SENATE REPUBLICAN WHIP NOTICE

UNITED STATES SENATE,
OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT MAJORITY LEADER,
Washington, DC, January 25, 1985.

DEAR COLLEAGUE: The program for the Senate is as follows:

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[42] Hearings on H.R. 13763, Senate Appropriations Committee, "Legislative Branch Appropriations for Fiscal Year 1970" (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1969), 755.

[43] Congressional Directory, 91st Cong. 2d sess. (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1970), 372.

[44] Personal interview, Senator Robert C. Byrd, Washington, D.C., January 1972. See Congressional Directory, 92d Cong., 1st sess., 378.

[45] Personal interview, Senator Robert Griffin, Washington, D.C., Aril 1972.

Monday, January 28, 1985:

The Senate will convene for a *pro forma* session at 10:00 a.m. No business will be conducted on Monday. Bills and resolutions may *not* be introduced.

Tuesday, January 29, 1985:

The Senate will convene at 2:00 p.m. Following the recognition of the two leaders under the standing order and two special orders, there will be a period for the transaction of routine morning business until 3:00 p.m. during which Senators may speak for not to exceed 5 minutes each. At 3:00 p.m., the Senate will go into executive session to consider the nomination of James A. Baker to be Secretary of the Treasury, under a two-hour time limitation. A roll-call vote on the Baker nomination is expected to occur at approximately 5:00 p.m.

Wednesday, January 30, 1985:

The legislative schedule for Wednesday and the balance of the week is uncertain. It is the intention of the leadership to take up nominations as they become available and as they are cleared for consideration.

As always, if you have any further questions, please contact my office at 4-2708.

ALAN K. SIMPSON,
Assistant Majority Leader.

Another change occurred in 1970 when the Republicans named six regional whips: Edward W. Brooke (Massachusetts), Edward J. Gurney (Florida), Charles H. Percy (Illinois), Jack Miller (Iowa), Clifford P. Hansen (Wyoming) and Mark O. Hatfield (Oregon). The creation of regional whips developed from a meeting between GOP Leader Hugh Scott and GOP Whip Robert Griffin.[46] Their purpose was to help implement Senator Scott's conception of "shared leadership," i.e., that a collective entity rather than an individual should guide Republican party fortunes in the Senate. Additionally, the creation of regional whips helped to coordinate and implement the party's program in the Senate; it broadened the base of leadership within the party; it improved the ability of the leadership to predict who will vote for or against the party on key issues; and it enabled the party to protect its interests by always having a whip on the floor to respond to attacks by the opposition. In fact, a prime duty of the GOP whip was to insure that, in his absence, a regional whip was always on the floor of the Senate.[47] A related

[46] At the beginning of the 92d Cong. (1971), the number of regional whips was decreased from six to five with only one holdover—Senator Edward Gurney. With the exception of Senator Gurney, all five previous regional whips were up for re-election in 1972. In 1972 the regional whips and the states they were responsible for were: Charles Mathias—Maryland, Delaware, Connecticut, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, Vermont, and Maine; William Saxbe—Ohio, Pennsylvania, New Jersey, Michigan, Illinois, and New York; Edward Gurney—Florida, Texas, Kentucky, Tennessee, and South Carolina; Henry Bellmon—Oklahoma, Nebraska, Wyoming, Kansas, North Dakota, South Dakota, and Iowa; Robert Packwood—Oregon, Alaska, Hawaii, Idaho, Colorado, Utah and Arizona.

[47] Personal interview, Mr. Cecil Holland, administrative assistant, Senator Robert Griffin, Washington, D.C., April 1972.

practice that predates the regional whip system, it should be noted, was that employed by Republican whip Thomas Kuchel (California). With the approval of GOP Leader Everett Dirksen (Illinois), Senator Kuchel used freshman members to assist him in his duties as party whip.[48]

The election of new Democratic (Alan Cranston of California) and Republican (Ted Stevens of Alaska) whips in 1977 produced several other noteworthy changes. Republican Whip Stevens replaced the regional GOP whip system with a new assistant whip structure to "make certain that the rights of [GOP] members are protected during Senate floor action."[49] In a novel departure, along with several of their more experienced colleagues, all first-year GOP Senators were accorded the opportunity to become assistant whips. Each assistant whip covered the floor on a rotating basis for about 2 hours.[50]

In another departure, GOP Whip Stevens introduced the practice of "double teaming" the floor. A GOP whip always was present to assist the party's floor manager during Senate debate on legislation. As a result, the GOP floor manager concentrated on substantive concerns, and the party whip on procedural issues that might arise during floor debate.

The selection of first-year Republicans as assistant whips was designed in part to facilitate their mastery of Senate floor procedures. The assistant Republican whips for the 96th Congress (1979–81) were:

William Armstrong (Colorado)
Rudy Boschwitz (Minnesota)
John Chafee (Rhode Island)
John Danforth (Missouri)
Thad Cochran (Mississippi)
William S. Cohen (Maine)
Orrin Hatch (Utah)
Gordon J. Humphrey (New Hampshire)
Larry Pressler (South Dakota)
Jesse Helms (North Carolina)
John Warner (Virginia)
Richard Lugar (Indiana)
James McClure (Idaho)
Harrison Schmitt (New Mexico)
Malcolm Wallop (Wyoming)
David Durenberger (Minnesota)

In addition to the assistant whip concept, Senator Stevens introduced other innovations during the 1977–81 period as assistant leader. First, he arranged briefings by the Senate Parliamentarian for newly elected Republicans on floor procedures. Second, Senator Stevens instituted periodic press briefings to better insure that the spectrum of GOP views on public issues was made known to the press and media. Third, the assistant leader prepared an inventory of the policy experts on the personal staffs of GOP Senators. With the White House then controlled by the opposition party, Senator Stevens believed it important for his party colleagues to have their

[48] Personal interview, Senator Thomas Kuchel, April 1970, Washington, D.C.
[49] Press release. Office of the Assistant Minority Leader, Feb. 7, 1977.
[50] Personal interview, Ms. Susan Alvarado, legislative assistant to the assistant minority leader, Washington, D.C., May 1979.

own in-house "information bank.'" Fourth, the Republican whip volunteered his Capitol office to colleagues for meetings with members, staff, or public officials. Fifth, Senator Stevens promoted party cohesiveness by sponsoring meetings of Republican Senators with contrasting policy viewpoints. Sixth, the assistant leader designated a member of his staff to act as a liaison with House Republicans. Seventh, to promote greater accuracy about the voting intentions of his colleagues, Senator Stevens conducted "whip counts" closely synchronized with floor decisionmaking. Finally, Senator Stevens directed his aides to encourage greater interaction among Republican staff on the floor, so GOP Senators will be kept informed and their interests protected.[51]

In 1981, with the Senate controlled by Republicans, the practice of appointing assistant whips came to an end. The decision by GOP leaders to abandon the practice was made for at least two key reasons, both of which relate to the party's newly won majority status. First, the Republican Party, "for the first time in a generation," noted GOP Leader Howard H. Baker, Jr. (Tennessee), had the "opportunity to lead a body of the Congress."[52] GOP Senators, in short, faced numerous new challenges, such as chairing committees (on average, each Republican Senator then headed 2.5 committees or subcommittees), and lacked the time for regular stints on the Senate floor as assistant whips. Further, the acquisition of parliamentary experience by junior Republicans, an objective of the assistant whip system, could now be obtained in other ways: by serving as floor managers for legislation reported from their committees or by presiding over the Senate.

Second, scheduling is a traditional majority party prerogative. As a result, Republican leaders necessarily maintain close supervision and direction of floor activities. Ever present on the Senate floor in addition to the party leaders or their designees are the majority floor manager and the Republican presiding officer (either Vice President George Bush, the President Pro Tempore, or a GOP Senator appointed to preside in the President Pro Tempore's absence).

When the 99th Congress convened, it was too soon to determine whether Majority Whip Simpson planned to reestablish an assistant whip system or some other form of whip organization. That topic was temporarily set aside as the GOP leadership concentrated in early 1985 on organizational and institutional matters and deficit, tax, and defense issues.

While the Democratic whip system in 1979 remained essentially as before, Democratic Whip Alan Cranston introduced several changes. For example, with the concurrence of the party leader, Senator Cranston increased the number of Democrats appointed as deputy whips (nine in 1979 as compared to four in 1975; by 1984, there were eleven deputy whips and one chief deputy whip). The increase strengthened the Democratic leadership's capacity to review and process the Senate's workload and to monitor sentiment for and against legistion. As Democratic Leader Byrd explained:

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[51] Personal interview, Senator Ted Stevens, Feb. 1977, Washington, D.C.
[52] 127 Congressional Record S15411 (Dec. 16, 1981).

> In the Senate, the whip system has developed under Mr. Cranston to the point now that there is an active organization of deputy whips. They meet regularly. They meet each week in the (Democratic) leader's office, at which time Mr. Cranston, the (Democratic) whip, chairs the meeting. Each deputy whip is assigned certain Members of the (Democratic) party to be contacted on issues that arise from time to time, and that deputy whip will be responsible for reporting on the position of his assigned Members.
>
> When I was Senate (Democratic) whip, I did not have meetings with deputy whips. As a matter of fact, the deputy whips in those days were not as numerous as they are today. I feel that the institutionalizing of the whips' meetings, the meetings of the deputy whips on a weekly basis and the enlargement of the number of deputy whips, are progressive innovations for which Mr. Cranston should be commended.[53]

As another example, Democratic Whip Cranston concerned himself with improving the timely transfer of legislative information to Senators, and with reducing both meeting conflicts among committees and between committees and the floor. To help accomplish these goals, Senator Cranston developed the computerization of whip notices. Every Friday, Democratic Whip Cranston prepares his weekly whip notice, which identifies the measures the majority leader has scheduled for consideration the following week. The whip notices can be "called up" by computer terminals located in senatorial offices. Changes in the floor schedule can be quickly transmitted on-line to every Senator.

Finally, Senator Cranston believes a major part of his job is "to pitch in on a bill that I'm deeply concerned about and seek to move it along." [54] Armed with his roll-call tally sheet, Democratic Whip Cranston helps to mobilize support behind issues he favors. Recounted a journalist:

> Cranston had not been in the Senate long before he started to get a reputation as its premier head counter. Combining a reporter's ability to ferret out information with finely tuned, instinctive antennae for the events around him, he learned to anticipate with great accuracy how balloting on major issues would go in the Senate. He used these skills to help sway votes and make deals. The sight of the lanky Senator from California walking through the hallways with a long sheet of paper, his head count of an upcoming vote, has become as much of a fixture in the Senate as the bean soup served in the Capitol.[55]

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[53] The first paragraph of Senator Byrd's remarks appeared in 126 Congressional Record S4496 (May 2, 1980); the second, made a week later, appears on page S5048.

[54] Quoted in Richard E. Cohen, "Byrd of West Virginia—A New Job, A New Image," 9 National Journal 1296 (Aug. 20, 1977).

[55] Robert Lindsey, "Dark Horse From California," The New York Times Magazine, Dec. 4, 1983, 94.

WHIP SELECTION AND BENEFITS

Senators from each party elect their top leaders before the beginning of each new Congress by secret ballot in their party conferences. For the most part, Senate leaders are in the mainstream of their party. "As a member of the leadership," noted Democratic Leader Byrd, "it is my duty to bring north and south, liberals and conservatives together; to work out compromises. . . . I think it takes a centrist to do that." [56] Since 1913, there have been 15 Democratic whips (for a complete listing of Democratic and Republican whips see table 1, below).

TABLE 1.—PARTY WHIPS IN THE U.S. SENATE, 1913–85

Name, State, years as whip	Years of whip service	Years in Senate before election	Advancement to party leader	Age at election as whip
DEMOCRATS				
J. Hamilton Lewis (Illinois, 1913–19, 1933–39)	12.0	0		51,69
Peter G. Gerry (Rhode Island, 1919–29)	10.0	2.0		39
Morris Sheppard (Texas, 1929–33)	4.0	16.0		53
Sherman Minton (Indiana, 1939–41)	2.0	4.0		48
Lister Hill (Alabama, 1941–47)	6.0	3.0		46
Scott Lucas (Illinois, 1947–49)	2.0	8.0	1949–50	55
Francis Myers (Pennsylvania, 1949–51)	2.0	4.0		48
Lyndon Johnson (Texas, 1951–53)	2.0	2.0	1953–60	42
Earle Clements (Kentucky, 1953–57)	4.0	2.0		56
Mike Mansfield (Montana, 1957–61)	4.0	4.0	1961–77	53
Hubert Humphrey (Minnesota, 1961–65)	4.0	12.0		49
Russell Long (Louisiana, 1965–69)	4.0	16.0		47
Edward Kennedy (Massachusetts, 1969–71)	2.0	6.0		36
Robert C. Byrd (West Virginia, 1971–77)	6.0	12.0	1977–	53
Alan Cranston (California, 1977–)		8.0		62
Average	4.6	6.6		50.4
REPUBLICANS				
James Wadsworth (New York, Dec. 6, 1915, to Dec. 13, 1915)	(1)	1.0		38
Charles Curtis (Kansas, 1915–24)	9.0	6.0	1925–29	54
Wesley L. Jones (Washington, 1924–29)	4.0	16.0		60
Simeon Fess (Ohio, 1929–33)	4.0	6.0		67
Felix Hebert (Rhode Island, 1933–35)	2.0	4.0		58
Kenneth Wherry (Nebraska, 1944–49)	5.0	1.0	1949–51	51
Leverett Saltonstall (Massachusetts, 1949–57)	8.0	4.0		56
Everett Dirksen (Illinois, 1957–59)	2.0	6.0	1959–69	60
Thomas Kuchel (California, 1959–69)	10.0	6.0		48
Hugh Scott (Pennsylvania, 1969)	1.0	10.0	1969–77	68
Robert Griffin (Michigan, 1969–77)	8.0	3.0		46
Ted Stevens (Alaska, 1977–85)	8.0	8.0		53
Alan K. Simpson (Wyoming, 1985–)		6.0		54
Average	5.6	6.3		56.3

[1] 1 week. Not included in compilation of averages.

Note: The Republicans elected no whip from 1935–1944; instead, the chairman of the GOP Conference appointed Senators to assist him (see footnote 58).

Sources: "Congressional Directory" 1913 to 1970; "Biographical Directory of the American Congress", 1774–1961; "American Political Science Review"; Mr. Mark Trice, secretary to the Senate Republican Party; Mr. Teddy Roe, special Assistant to the Secretary of the Senate Democratic Party. In Prof. Arthur Macmahon's analysis of the 1st session of the 71st Congress, Senator Key Pittman of Nevada is listed as whip for the Democrats (see 24 "American Political Science Review" 40, February 1930). Prof. Fred Israel, author of "Nevada's Key Pittman", (1933), stated in a telephone conversation that he could not substantiate that Senator Pittman was ever a party whip. Additionally, this writer examined the Key Pittman Papers (1898 to 1951) in the Manuscript Division of the Library of Congress and found no evidence that Senator Pittman had been a party whip.

[56] 122 Congressional Record 3137 (Feb. 16, 1976).

Senator J. Hamilton Lewis of Illinois served the longest—12 years. (Senator Cranston, however, is the first Democract to win five consecutive terms as whip.) Democratic whips have served an average of 4.6 years before either advancing to another party office, resigning, losing to another contender for the position, or suffering defeat at the polls. The average age of these men at the time of their election to the post was 50.4 years. In a body noted for its adherence to the custom of seniority, nine first-term Senators were elected to the office of party whip.

Of the 13 Republican whips since 1915, Senator Thomas Kuchel of California served the longest—10 years—before his primary defeat in 1968. Republican whips served an average of 6.3 years in the Senate before assuming that post and an average of 5.6 years in the position. The average age of Republicans when elected to the whip post was 56.3 years. The data indicate that there are very few recruitment differences in age or length of service between Democractic and Republican party whips.[57]

Senators are elected whip for many reasons: (1) they bridge ideological polarities in their party; (2) they can mediate and negotiate effectively; and (3) they have learned the arts of parliamentary procedure. When these qualities are joined with personal popularity, as in the case of Republican Whip Simpson, they are a difficult combination to beat. In explaining his unsuccessful race against Simpson, a GOP senator said, "I picked the member who may be the most popular man in the Senate to run against." [58] Longevity of legislative service, however, is not a prime qualification for election. As Donald R. Matthews concluded:

> The leader's job requires vast energy, tolerance, patience, a willingness to pay infinite attention to details, manipulative ability, a sense of 'news,' and a talent for creative compromise, but the exact mixture of these skills needed for effective leadership varies from one situation to another.[59]

A knowledge of human nature, amiability, service, tact, and complete self-control, Marvin Stromer observed, were the essential qualities a whip must have.[60] Senator Leverett Saltonstall (Republican, Massachusetts) once observed that a party whip must like people and get along with them if he is to do an effective job.[61] In addition, Senator Griffin has stated that a whip must be willing to (1) serve long hours on the floor and (2) respond quickly to requests

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[57] No Republican whips were appointed from 1935 to 1944 since only 17 Republicans were in the Senate following the landslide election of President Franklin D. Roosevelt in 1936. Accordingly, the minutes of the Republican Conference for this period state: "On motion of Senator Hastings, duly seconded and carried, it was agreed that no Assistant Leader or Whip be elected but that the chairman be authorized to appoint Senators from time to time to assist him in taking charge of the interests of the minority." A note attached to the conference minutes added: "The chairman of the conference, Senator McNary, apparently appointed Senator Austin of Vermont as assistant leader in 1943 and 1944, until the conference adopted Rules of Organization." Letter from Mark Trice to Lewis Williams, Oct. 2, 1950, supra. Also see 126 Congressional Record S10656 (Aug. 4, 1980).

[58] Diane Granat, "Senate Republicans Choose Officers: Dole Elected Majority Leader; Simpson Wins GOP Whip Job," 44 "Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report," 3022 (Dec. 1, 1984).

[59] Donald R. Matthews. "U.S. Senators and Their World" (1960), 129.

[60] Marvin E. Stromer, "The Making of a Political Leader." (1969), 48.

[61] Personal interview, Senator Leverett Saltonstall, November 1969, Boston, Mass.

for information from his party colleagues, either personally or through an assistant on the Senate floor.[62]

As Table 1 reveals, eight of the 28 Senate whips were elevated to the office of majority or minority leader from the assistant floor leader's position. The importance of the whip's office as a stepping-stone to the party leadership is a recent development in both parties and one that is perceived by Senators to be important. Democratic Senator Russell Long of Louisiana, for example, pointed out:

> When I ran for the position of majority whip, I had very much in mind the fact that men I had known like Lyndon Johnson and Mike Mansfield had served as whip before becoming the majority leader. It's the logical stepping-stone in that direction.[63]

Because of the increased visibility of the whip's role within his own party and the opportunity it affords the incumbent to establish good relations with his colleagues, that office has become an important step on the pathway to the party leadership.

Seven of the eight whips who became either majority or minority leader did so in the period from 1949 to 1977. Before that, only Charles Curtis (Republican, Kansas) became his party's leader in the era before 1949, serving as majority leader from 1925 to 1929. Two reasons may account for the lack of stepping-stone potential in the whip's office during this early period. First, before 1949 both parties sometimes appointed not only a whip but also an assistant leader, who potentially was next in the line of succession to the floor leader's post.[64] More important, however, was the nascent and nebulous state of the official party apparatus, making it unclear who would replace whom and under what circumstances. The chairman of the conference of both parties, for example, was for many years the only officially designated party leader; from this position, it has been concluded, emerged the office of the floor leader.[65]

Several disparate reasons account for the failure of the five Democratic whips—Myers, Clements, Humphrey, Long, and Kennedy—and three Republican whips—Kuchel, Griffin and Stevens—to become their party's floor leader in the post-1949 period. Myers, Clements, and Kuchel were defeated for re-election; Humphrey left the Senate to become Vice President of the United States; Long was defeated by Kennedy for the whip's office; Kennedy was defeated by Robert C. Byrd of West Virginia; Griffin lost to Senator Howard H. Baker, Jr. (Tennessee) in his 1977 bid for the top GOP post; and Dole narrowly defeated Stevens. Senator Saltonstall left his whip position to become Republican conference chairman in 1957.

Even though the whips, since 1949, have appeared to be next in line to succeed to the leadership of the party, it should be stressed

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[62] Personal interview, Senator Robert Griffin, April 1972, Washington, D.C.

[63] Cecil Holland. "Senator Russell Long—Acumen, Affability, Ambition," in 112 Congressional Record 24748 (Oct. 3, 1966).

[64] See New York Times, Feb. 4, 1923, 23. and New York Times, Mar. C, 1929, 3.

[65] George H. Haynes, "The Senate of the United States: Its History and Practices," (1938), 380. Also see Margaret Munk, "Origin and Development of the Party Floor Leadership in the United States Senate," Capitol Studies, Winter 1974, 23–41.

that this is a matter of probability and not of certainty. No fixed or formalized system of party advancement can be discerned. Republican whip Leverett Saltonstall, for example, was bypassed for the leadership position in 1952 when Senator Robert A. Taft of Ohio, the majority leader, appointed Senator William Knowland of California to be acting majority leader in his absence. Political observers of that time speculated that many conservative Republican leaders opposed the elevation of a liberal like Senator Saltonstall to the majority leader's position.[66]

Among the benefits that accrue to a senator who becomes a whip are additional staff and office space, numerous invitations to social, diplomatic, and political functions, and increased public visibility because of mass media coverage. Two other benefits are particularly important—access to the President (especially when his party controls the White House) and full knowledge of all Senate activities. As David Truman observed:

> In a governmental system in which the executive bulks large and in which the influence structures that determine public policy are varied and shifting, information on the plans of the President and his staff is a major asset.[67]

A clear illustration of the access to information enjoyed by a whip is furnished by Senator Thomas Kuchel of California:

> I was impressed during the consideration of the nuclear test ban treaty with the joint hearings which were conducted by members of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, the Senate Committee on Armed Services, and the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy. As assistant Republican leader, I was invited to attend these sessions as were others in the leadership. I did attend them, and found the information developed there, by Senators who were experts in the work of the various committees and who had thus viewed the problems of nuclear energy and power from different perspectives, most helpful to me in arriving at my own decisions.[68]

Obviously, the more knowledgeable a party leader is, the more he may function as a source of information for his partisan colleagues and as adviser to them at their request.

Evidently some whips have thought the position gave them a home-state advantage in the legislative process. Former Democratic whip Russell Long (Louisiana) wrote in his March 4, 1967, newsletter to his constituents that he was glad to be whip because it allowed him to do more for his state.[69] Similarly, Senator Alan Cranston said that his election as Democratic whip "will enhance my opportunities to be effective on behalf of California."[70] Senator Stevens also stated that he could do more for Alaska as assistant Republican leader.[71]

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[66] See, for example, Cabell Phillips, "Majority Leader of a Majority of One," New York Times Magazine, July 19, 1953. 13.
[67] Truman, Congressional Party, 131.
[68] 111 Congressional Record 11214 (May 21, 1965).
[69] Cited in Ripley, "Power in the Senate," 94.
[70] Press release (1-77), Office of U.S. Senator Alan Cranston, Jan. 5, 1977, 1.
[71] Personal interview, Senator Ted Stevens, Feb. 1977, Washington, D.C.

Duties of Senate Whips

The duties of the whip are formally spelled out only in the rules of the Republican Conference. They state: "The Assistant Floor Leader shall assist in securing attendance of members at Party Conferences and upon the floor of the Senate when their presence is considered necessary by the Chairman or the Floor Leader, and shall perform such other duties as the Chairman or Floor Leader may require." This description, general as it is, underscores the chief duty of whips—that of assisting the party's floor leader.

The GOP whip also conducts, either directly or with the help of the party secretary, a whip check to determine how Republicans will vote on particular issues. These vote counts are generally undertaken when issues are too close to call and support from the other party may be necessary to put the GOP position over the top. The Republican whip often concentrates on senators whose position on legislation is unclear or not known. Whip counts, needless to say, are closely held by the Republican leadership.

Democrats, too, conduct whip counts and, as mentioned earlier, Senator Cranston excels at this activity in part because he determines where the votes are on issues by surveying Democratic *and* Republican Senators. "The best nose-counter in the Senate, [Democratic Whip Cranston] is absolutely superb when it comes to knowing how the votes will fall in place on a given issue," declared Democratic Leader Byrd.[72]

Canvasses of senatorial voting intentions typically occur at the initiative of either the Democratic Leader or Democratic Whip or, on occasion, at the request of party colleagues. The deputy whips are also actively involved in the process of determining the voting predilections of colleagues; their findings are then employed by the Democratic leadership to identify which wavering senators—even those in opposition—might be persuaded to back the party's position.

> Where the tally sheets show that Senators will oppose the position taken by the party or by the leadership, the [Democratic] leader, the [Democratic] whip, and the team of whips then are in a position to, in some instances, discuss the matter with those Senators and present the case for a supportive vote and occasionally are successful in getting the Members to change their position prior to the votes. However, this is not often.[73]

It was once the chief duty of a whip to arrange pairs and know the whereabouts of Senate colleagues, but in recent years this task has been occasionally handled not by the whip's office, but by the floor leader's staff or more often by the secretaries to the majority and minority parties. For example, in 1949 Senator Ralph E. Flanders (Republican, Vermont) delivered a note to his party's whip, Kenneth S. Wherry, stating:

> Instead of arranging for a general pair as I told you on the floor, we have agreed to leave the pairing on specific

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[72] Wall Street Journal, March 15, 1977, 1.
[73] 126 Congressional Record S4496 (May 2, 1980).

> questions up to Mark Trice (secretary to the majority) and his opposite number. I have left my instructions with him.[74]

It remains a fundamental responsibility of whips, however, to keep the "Members of their party in attendance during the consideration of controversial issues." [75]

Because of the absence of any official formulation, the whip's duties have been defined by precedent, with some variation developing from the different interpretations of the whip's role by those who have held the position as well as from the feelings and attitudes toward the whip's role held by whoever is majority (minority) leader. For example, Republican whip Thomas Kuchel stated that he learned the duties of his job from several sources: (1) The activities of previous party whips; (2) the writings of former Senator Hiram Johnson (California); (3) the advice given him by certain Senators; (4) suggestions offered by his party leader; and (5) his personal definition of what a whip should do.[76] In the case of Senator Robert Griffin, his conception of a whip's role developed from: (1) His previous service in the House, (2) his personal determination of what the whip's duties should be, such as preparation of whip notices, and (3) the need he felt as a junior Senator to be more fully informed on what to expect in the way of Senate action.[77]

Views concerning the work of a whip by several Senators who have held this post help to illuminate the assistant floor leader's tasks. The first Democratic whip, J. Hamilton Lewis (Illinois), put it this way:

> The duties of the Senate whip demand his presence on the floor as constantly as possible. Sometimes the long hours test his physical capacity, but generally he is devoted to "watchful waiting." He is ex officio assistant floor leader, and in the absence of the floor leader, and other assistants, may be called upon to represent his party. At rollcalls he reports absentees and pairs which have been brought to his attention. He is not supposed to introduce bills lest they may divert his attention from his floor duties. While the parliamentary whip is not supposed to engage in debate, there is no such restriction on the congressional whips. In fact as assistant floor leader it often becomes necessary for them to do so.[78]

The biographer of the Republican whip from 1944 to 1949 wrote:

> Senator Kenneth S. Wherry saw himself as an official who was chosen by his party to assist in maintaining party discipline and united action in the day-to-day deliberations of the U.S. Senate. He viewed his position as being responsible for the attendance of party members and for the arranging and controlling of the "pairing" process. He reported the absentees, pairs, and voting attitudes of the

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[74] Stromer, "Political Leader," 49.
[75] 126 Congressional Record S4496 (May 2, 1980).
[76] Personal interview, Senator Thomas Kuchel, April 1970, Washington, D.C.
[77] Personal interview, Senator Robert Griffin, Washington, D.C., April 1972.
[78] 80 Congressional Record 7046 (May 12, 1936).

> members on rollcalls. He consulted with and worked under the party floor leader in arranging the order of business of the Senate; and he handled the details of the weekly and day-to-day legislative programs, consulting with the floor secretary of his own party and with the whip of the Democratic party.[79]

Senator Leverett Saltonstall, Republican whip from 1949 to 1957, succinctly described his job. He stated that the whip's chief responsibility was to do the "dirty work" as assistant floor leader, i.e., being on the Senate floor or ensuring that, in the whip's absence, someone designated by him would be there to protect the party and national interest.[80]

In addition to his Senate leadership functions, party whips sometimes act as Senate spokesperson for major White House policies when their party controls the presidency.[81] Senator J. Hamilton Lewis gave his view of the whip's relationship to the White House:

> I particularly desire to stress that it is not sufficient as a justification for our opposition that we ourselves individually may feel that the President is wrong. The President of the United States, coming directly from the people has the right to be wrong. He may be wrong according to the estimate of some other man, he may be wrong according to the measure of some other community; but if he is fulfilling the directions of the people who placed him in office, at the same time giving him instructions as to the methods of relief they seek, however wrong it may appear to the individual here and there, that cannot be a justification for opposition to the measure.[82]

Senate whips may support a particular measure because their leadership position "requires" them to back the President, particularly on matters involving national security. On occasion, however, party whips have taken positions opposed to those of their President, as witness the opposition of GOP Whip Robert Griffin to President Nixon's nomination of Clement F. Haynsworth to the Supreme Court. Griffin stated that on issues where the policy position of the White House differed from his own, a Republican leader who supported Administration views defended them on the floor of the Senate.[83]

Party whips have underscored their responsibility to make the Senate work as efficiently and effectively as possible. My most important responsibility, Democratic Whip Cranston said, "is to try to make the Senate work well, to make it strong and to preserve its independence," [84] In a similar vein, GOP Whip Stevens stated his intention to seek improvements in the management of the Senate and to work in bipartisan fashion to achieve that objective.[85]

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[79] Stromer, "Political Leader,"46.
[80] Personal interview, Senator Leverett Saltonstall, November 1969, Boston, Mass.
[81] Truman, "Congressional Party," ch.8.
[82] New York Times, Mar. 29, 1934, 22.
[83] Personal interview, Senator Robert Griffin, Washington , D.C. April 1972.
[84] Press release (1-77). Office of U.S. Senator Alan Cranston, Jan. 5, 1977, 1.
[85] Personal interview, Senator Ted Stevens, April 1972, Washington, D.C.

To be sure, whips' duties vary somewhat in emphasis depending upon whether their party controls the Senate and/or White House. In broad terms, if the whip's party is in the minority in both branches, then the assistant floor leader's job focuses significantly on promoting party unity and alternatives while urging the other party's Senators to join with the minority to defeat or modify unwanted majority party initiatives. Efforts to prevent the majority party from attaining its goals also rank high on the minority whip's list of activities. The majority whip's jobs, by contrast, are to gather support for various White House initiatives (if the president is a member of the same party), promote the development of policies by the senatorial party and, in general, assume with other party colleagues basic responsibility for having the Senate dispose of such essential issues as debt ceiling extensions, continuing resolutions, or emergency measures.

In sum, the jobs of Senate whips have evolved over the decades to embrace a variety of responsibilities. Among the most important are: provide assistance to the floor leader and, during his absence, serve as *ex officio* party leader; conduct and interpret whip counts; maintain liaison with the other body; plan strategy on legislation; aid the reelection efforts of party colleagues; assist or, depending upon the circumstances, thwart the president in his attempt to secure passage of White House-sponsored measures or nominations; mobilize winning coalitions for the party's program; strengthen the Senate as an institution; insure that colleagues are on the floor at the right time; promote party unity; protect the party's interests during floor deliberations; and act, on occasion, as the party's spokesperson.[86] Like other Senators, party whips are also involved in myriad other activities, such as serving on committees and subcommittees.

Floor Leader-Whip Relations

The relation between the floor leader and his assistant parallels, in some ways, that between the President and Vice President of the United States: Both the whip and Vice President depend to a great extent, though not completely of course, upon the directions and duties given them by their party's leader; both have ill-defined responsibilities; and, at times, whips and Vice Presidents have been selected more for political or geographical balance than for ideological compatibility.[87]

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[86] For a somewhat different review of the whip's responsibilities, note the following: (1) The scheduling and management of legislation; (2) keeping his party advised about proposed action on legislation; (4) remaining informed about national and international problems and the status of bills in standing committees; (5) dealing with all procedural questions on the floor; and (6) offering various technical motions relative to the organization of the Senate at the beginning of each new Congress. Since 1941, for example, the majority party whip has announced the hour of meeting for the Senate. See Floyd M. Riddick, "Majority and Minority Leaders of the Senate," Senate Document 95-24 (Washington, DC.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1977).

[87] It was reported, for example, that "the choice of Senator Humphrey for Democratic whip was intended to give the party's advanced liberal wing a greater voice in the leadership councils." See New York Times, December 2, 1960, 24. Geography, too, may play a role in the selection of party whips. In 1956 Senator George Smathers (Democrat, Florida), thought of seeking the whip position but stated that since a southerner, Lyndon Johnson of Texas, already held the floor leader's post, a geographic division in the leadership was desirable. See New York Times, Nov. 13 1956, 1. For further discussion of the geographic aspects of whip selection see Rowland Evans and Robert Novak, "Lyndon B. Johnson: The Exercise of Power" (1966), 41-44.

Just as a Vice President is likely to be more active and effective in national affairs if he is close, personally and/or ideologically, to the President, whips too may be more influential in managing the Senate if they are close to their floor leaders. The floor leaders' conceptions of their role also affect the activities of the whips.

When Lyndon B. Johnson became his party's leader, he held the levers of power in his own hands while his whip, Senator Mike Mansfield, functioned more as an agent of coordination and persuasion and less as a codirector of legislative activities. As Ralph Huitt pointed out: "Johnson sometimes approached those Senators he was not 'easy' with through the Democratic whip, Senator Mike Mansfield, or the secretary of the majority, Robert G. Baker."[88] Following Senator Johnson's heart attack in 1955, however, much of the workload of Senate management was handled by Senator Mansfield. It was then reported that Mansfield "is coming to be acknowledged as the major foreign policy spokesman among younger Democrats, and he is moving into a position of active partnership with the Senate Majority Leader, Lyndon Baines Johnson."[89] In brief, how a floor leader utilizes the whip varies for reasons such as personal rapport, ideology, or circumstances.

Several Republican Examples

Even though Senator Leverett Saltonstall, Republican whip from 1949 to 1957, and Senator Kenneth S. Wherry, Republican minority leader from 1949 to 1951, represented respectively the liberal and conservative wings of their party, they enjoyed one another's confidence. As a result, Senator Saltonstall played an active role in keeping his party advised about legislation under Wherry's leadership. The relationship between Saltonstall and Wherry became particularly close when Wherry was taken ill and Saltonstall became acting Republican leader from August 31 to October 20, 1951. Each night, Wherry's biographer reported, Senator Saltonstall conferred with Senator Wherry in his hospital room about Senate business.[90] On the other hand, when Senator William Knowland of California became Republican leader in 1952 and Saltonstall remained as whip, the close relation that had marked the association between Saltonstall and Wherry ceased to exist. Senator Saltonstall once stated that Senator Knowland kept his own counsel about legislative business, preferring to direct his party without the assistance of his whip. Hence, the role of the Republican whip was of less importance during this period.

Senators Hugh Scott (Republican, Pennsylvania) and Robert Griffin, (Republican, Michigan), formerly minority leader and assistant floor leader, respectively, worked together closely on all phases of the legislative process, keeping each other fully informed about all occurrences that affected the Senate's business. Senator Scott believed that the "shared-leadership" approach was the best way to

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[88] Huitt, "Democratic Party Leadership," 338.

[89] New York Times, Feb. 25, 1957, 17. Another example of a whip as policymaker was provided by Senator Hubert Humphrey (Democrat, Minnesota) who often "served as acting majority leader for agriculture, medical, and health, and civil rights legislation." See "Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report," Sept. 25, 1964, 2251-2252.

[90] Personal interview, Senator Leverett Saltonstall, November 1969, Boston, Mass. and Stromer, "Political Leader," 156.

give direction to his party.[91] A collegial decisionmaking process was employed by the GOP leadership to determine national and party priorities. At all levels, as the Republican whip, Senator Griffin played a key role in the decisionmaking process.

For example, with Senator Scott's concurrence, Griffin assumed many leadership duties on the Republican side. At Senator Scott's request, Griffin consulted closely with Senator Byrd, then Democratic whip, to facilitate the workload of the Senate. Griffin was involved in such decisions as developing or modifying unanimous consent agreements; clearing measures for floor action; determining when votes on amendments and final passage should occur; obtaining special orders for other Senators to speak; and in other ways working to insure that the whip's office served all Republican Senators.[92]

The GOP leadership of Senators Baker and Stevens, in place from 1977 through 1984, worked smoothly together. They regularly consulted about Senate and party business and kept each other informed about legislative and political developments. Frequently decisions regarding Senate business were jointly made. And Senator Baker looked to his whip for aid in strengthening Senate operations.

Among the circumstances that accounted for their relationship, at least two are noteworthy. First, in 1980, during Senator Baker's run for the presidency, GOP Whip Stevens became acting or standin party leader. This experience gave Senator Stevens keener insights into the floor leader's responsibilities and further cemented his relation with Senator Baker. "I'm the acting Minority Leader," said Senator Stevens. "When (Baker's) gone, I do his job and mine, too. We dovetail our staff and our relationship is a good one." [93]

Second, Senator Stevens was not reluctant to take the lead on certain controversial issues, such as pay raises for senators. "Service in the Senate," the GOP Whip once said, "should not require a sacrifice." [94] Senator Stevens' ability and willingness to assume political "heat" on those kinds of issues was appreciated by many of his colleagues, including Senator Baker.

Perhaps the best example of their working partnership occurred during 1981 when they, along with other participants, forged extraordinary unity among Republicans which propelled President Reagan's economic program through the Senate. Recounted one scholar:

> Throughout the year, Senate Democrats offered a blizzard of amendments [to budget resolutions], some to harass the opposition, some as genuine alternatives. With only a six-seat margin in the Senate, the Republicans might have lost if only a handful defected. This rarely happened, how-

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[91] Personal interview, Mr. William Hildenbrand, special assistant to Senator Hugh Scott, November 1969, and Mr. Cecil Holland, administrative assistant, Senator Robert Griffin, November 1969.

[92] Personal interview, Mr. Cecil Holland, administrative assistant, Senator Robert Griffin, Washington, D.C., April 1972.

[93] Quoted in Robert L. Peabody, "Senate Party Leadership: From the 1950s to the 1980s," in Frank H. Mackaman, ed., Understanding Congressional Leadership (1981), 84.

[94] Irwin B. Arieff, "Stevens Boldly Pursues 'Perks' for Senators," Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report, Feb. 6, 1982, 207.

> ever, as the Republicans repeatedly united against Democratic attacks. . . . Six times, the Republicans voted en bloc against the Democrats; five times, all but one Republican voted with the party; on seven of the votes, there were only two defections. The Republicans stood together on the first budget resolution and on the reconciliation bill. On a series of Democratic amendments to retarget the tax reductions, the Republicans averaged fewer than two defections. Even when the Democratic amendments were "popular," they failed to crack Republican unity. Only three Republicans sided with the opposition on lowering the tax rates for two-income households; only six voted to increase tax assistance for the elderly.[95]

Although it is too early to assess the Dole-Simpson leadership team, it is clear that each brings considerable talents to their respective assignments: political skill, legislative craftsmanship, adroitness at conciliation, and quick wit. As a scholar of congressional leadership pointed out:

> Dole and Simpson are both solid moderate-to-conservative senators who will represent their party well for years to come. Their strengths will be that they speak for a solid proportion of the party in terms of ideology. Both are respected and adept floor managers when they have bills before them. And finally, of course, they're both very funny people.[96]

Several Democratic Examples

The top Democratic leaders have also worked closely together. During the past fifteen years, the leadership pairs of Mansfield-Kennedy, Mansfield-Byrd, and Byrd-Cranston operated effectively in a Senate that underwent considerable change—for example, from Democratic to Republican control and from a centralized style of leadership during Lyndon Johnson's tenure as majority leader (1955–61) to a Senate that is today characterized by the wide dispersion of influence to all senators. Leadership styles, in sum, shifted with changes in the institutional and political dynamics of the Senate.

A close personal relationship evidently existed between Senator Mike Mansfield (Democrat, Montana), and the former party whip, Edward Kennedy of Massachusetts. Senator Mansfield gave high praise to Senator Kennedy's performance as Democratic whip and even recommended that Senator Kennedy refer to himself as the assistant majority leader, a title more descriptive of his duties.[97] With the knowledge and approval of Senator Mansfield, Kennedy expanded the conception and duties of his office in several ways: Kennedy regularly conducted meetings with groups of Senators to

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[95] Allen Schick, "How the Budget Was Won and Lost," in Norman J. Ornstein, ed., "President and Congress, Assessing Reagan's First Year," (1982), 18.

[96] Granat, "Senate Republicans Choose Officers," 3022.

[97] 115 Congressional Record 13717 (May 26, 1969). Also see Kennedy's tribute to Mansfield in 115 Congressional Record 41139 (Dec. 23, 1969). Personal interviews, Mr. Teddy Roe, assistant to the secretary of the Senate majority, October 1969, and Mr. Wayne Owens, special assistant, Senator Edward Kennedy, October 1969.

discuss policy matters; he sponsored a seminar for freshman Senators to familiarize them with the legislative process; and he organized meetings with Senate staff personnel as a means to exchange ideas about legislative issues.[98] As Senator Mansfield concluded: "The relationship that a whip has with the leader is a close and cooperative one. This party leader does not influence the activities of the whip but works closely together with him and if we differ on specific issues, we go our separate ways insofar as the vote is concerned."[99]

On January 21, 1971, Senator Robert C. Byrd (West Virginia) was elected Democratic whip by his party colleagues, defeating Senator Edward Kennedy's re-election bid. Senator Byrd, from 1967 to 1971 Secretary to the Democratic conference, the third ranking party leadership position, spent long hours on the Senate floor assisting Majority Leader Mansfield.[100] Senator Byrd's role as Secretary, plus his diligent and systematic study of Senate rules and precedents, prepared him well in legislative procedure.

Because of this previous floor association, Mansfield and Byrd enjoyed a close professional relationship as majority leader and majority whip. Both consulted daily about party and legislative matters and worked together to schedule legislation for floor consideration. Senator Byrd stated:

> The job of the whip, as I view it, is to do the floor work, assist the majority leader, and promote Democratic policy as formulated by the Majority leader and the Democratic Policy Committee.[101]

He further stated his duty is to be 100 percent loyal to the majority leader; if they disagreed on legislative issues, each voted his own convictions.[102] Senator Mansfield described their relations as "excellent."[103]

With Mansfield's approval, Senator Byrd expanded the functions of his office in at least two important ways. First, Senator Byrd distributed to all Democratic Senators a weekly whip notice (more frequently when necessary) that listed in detail (1) the measures to be discussed on each day, (2) whether rollcall votes were to be taken on those measures, sometimes even specifying the exact hour when such votes will occur, (3) Senators scheduled to speak at the beginning of a day's session for a time not to exceed 15 minutes or for a longer period following the end of legislative business, and (4) the measures that may be considered in the week(s) ahead

The usual procedure was for Democratic Whip Byrd to write a draft of a whip notice and consult with Senator Mansfield about it. After this initial consultation, Byrd incorporated Mansfield's suggestions, making whatever changes were needed, and then returned later for a final discussion with Mansfield about the legisla-

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[98] Personal interview, Mr. Wayne Owens, special assistant, Senator Edward Kennedy, Washington, D.C., October 1969. See Washington Post, June 15, 1969. A6.

[99] Memorandum from Senator Mike Mansfield to the author, Dec. 2, 1969.

[100] Personal interview, Senator Robert Byrd, Washington, D.C., January 1972.

[101] Transcript of "Face the Nation," CBS television program, Jan. 31, 1971. Reprinted in 117 Congressional Record 1374 (Feb 2, 1971).

[102] Personal interview, Senator Robert Byrd, Washington, D.C., January 1972.

[103] Personal interview, Senator Mike Mansfield, Washington, D.C., February 1972.

tive agenda.[104] This general procedure is similarly followed by Democratic Leader Byrd and Democratic Whip Cranston.

With the approval of Senator Mansfield and the concurrence of all Senators, Senator Byrd made increasingly frequent use of unanimous consent agreements (1) to limit debate on bills, amendments, and amendments to amendments, (2) to determine who shall control the time for floor debate, (3) to authorize floor consideration of measures at certain periods in the day's proceedings, (4) to determine when votes shall occur, (5) to prohibit the introduction of nongermane amendments, (6) to schedule legislative measures for floor debate, and (7) to modify unanimous consent agreements previously made.

It was also during the early 1970s that the Democratic leadership of Mansfield and Byrd instituted, with the cooperation and approval of Republican leaders, what is referred to as the "track system." This innovative scheduling device permits the Senate to have several pieces of legislation pending on the floor simultaneously by designating specific periods during the day when each proposal will be considered. Before the initiation of the track system, legislative business came to an abrupt halt during filibusters. The "two-track system enables the Senate to circumvent that barrier," noted Democratic Whip Cranston. The Senate "can now continue to work on all other legislation on one 'track' while a filibuster against a particular piece of legislation is . . . in progress on the other 'track'." [105]

With the voluntary retirement of Mike Mansfield from the Senate, Democratic Whip Byrd was elected in 1977 to be his party's leader and Alan Cranston was chosen by his party colleagues to be Democratic Whip. Senator Cranston, to be sure, is a valuable associate of Senator Byrd. Known as a skillful parliamentarian, prodigious worker, and premier vote-counter, as noted earlier, Cranston has also been very helpful to new Senators by assisting them in understanding Senate procedures and in lining up votes for their legislation. These special talents were factors in Cranston's election as whip and helped to produce, in his own words, a "close working relationship" with Senator Byrd.[106]

CONCLUSIONS

Several conclusions emerge from this study. First, unlike the rise to power of committee chairmen, and even to a degree the assignment of Senators to committees, election to the office of party whip—or for that matter of floor leaders—does not rest on the custom of seniority but on other factors. Some of the most important of these are: (1) selection by the party leader, e.g., Senator Lyndon Johnson's choice of Senator Mike Mansfield to become his assistant in 1957;[107] (2) the need for ideological balance in the lead-

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[104] Personal interview, Senator Robert C. Byrd, Jan. 1972, Washington, D.C.
[105] 121 Congressional Record 928 (Jan. 21, 1975).
[106] Press release (1-77). Office of U.S. Senator Alan Cranston, Jan. 5, 1977, 1.
[107] Robert L. Peabody, "Senate Leadership Change: 1953-1970," (paper delivered at the Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, Los Angeles, Calif., Sept. 8-12, 1970), 14.

ership, e.g., Senator Saltonstall's selection as GOP whip in 1949 as a leadership spokesman for liberal elements in the party; [108] (3) some White House support, e.g., President John Kennedy's support of Senator Hubert Humphrey for majority whip in 1961; [109] (4) qualities such as legislative skill, persuasiveness, energy, youth, and political instinct, which enabled Senator Lyndon Johnson to become whip after only 2 years in the Senate; [110] (5) a reputation earned in previous Congresses for effective leadership as in the case of Senators Robert Griffin, Ted Stevens, and Alan Simpson; (6) recognized competency in legislative procedure, organizational ability, energy, political instinct, or previous service in a party post, as in Senator Robert C. Byrd's case; and (7) respect among colleagues as a member who does his homework, and who is a skilled parliamentarian and vote-counter, as in Senator Alan Cranston's case.

Second, the office of whip has expanded in function in both parties since its creation in the early 1900's. When first established, party whips were mainly responsible for insuring party attendance, a duty now performed chiefly by the secretaries to each party. The first whips were even expected to refrain from introducing legislation. Now, however, the whip's duties have been broadened to include his role as assistant party leader; further, there has been an expansion of the whip's informal responsibilities, such as gathering and transmitting political intelligence to party colleagues.

A third conclusion is that party leaders are decisive in determining the activities of their whips. Ideological differences between them do have an effect on the whip's role and might prevent a whip's advancement to the leadership position.

During the postwar years, the position of whip in both parties has gained considerable importance. Not only have whips become leaders in their own right; they are also often the heirs apparent to their party's leadership. Senate whips, in short, are key leaders in the work of the Senate. As former GOP Leader Everett McKinley Dirksen colorfully stated:

> There are 100 diverse personalities in the U.S. Senate. O Great God, what an amazing and dissonant 100 personalities they are! What an amazing thing it is to harmonize them. What a job it is.[111]

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[108] Truman, "Congressional Party," 16-17.

[109] "Senate Democrats May Need New Whip in 1965," "Congressional Quarterly, Inc.," Sept. 14, 1964, 1.

[110] Evans and Novak, "Lyndon B. Johnson," 43.

[111] Quoted in Mackaman, Understanding Congressional Leadership, v.

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